Use of strong cryptographic keys significantly increases the level of security of encrypted account data.
See the sources referenced at Cryptographic Key Generation in Appendix G .
Secure distribution or conveyance of secret or private cryptographic keys means that keys are distributed only to authorized custodians, as identified in Requirement 3.6.1.2, and are never distributed insecurely.
Storing keys without proper protection could provide access to attackers, resulting in the decryption and exposure of account data.
Data encryption keys can be protected by encrypting them with a key-encrypting key.
Keys can be stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM).
Secret or private keys that can decrypt data should never be present in source code.
Changing encryption keys when they reach the end of their cryptoperiod is imperative to minimize the risk of someone obtaining the encryption keys and using them to decrypt data.
A cryptoperiod is the time span during which a cryptographic key can be used for its defined purpose. Cryptoperiods are often defined in terms of the period for which the key is active and/or the amount of cipher- text that has been produced by the key. Considerations for defining the cryptoperiod include, but are not limited to, the strength of the underlying algorithm, size or length of the key, risk of key compromise, and the sensitivity of the data being encrypted.
NIST SP 800-57 Part 1, Revision 5, Section 5.3 Cryptoperiods – provides guidance for establishing the time span during which a specific key is authorized for use by legitimate entities, or the keys for a given system will remain in effect. See Table 1 of SP 800-57 Part 1 for suggested cryptoperiods for different key types.
Keys that are no longer required, keys with weakened integrity, and keys that are known or suspected to be compromised, should be archived, revoked, and/or destroyed to ensure that the keys can no longer be used.
If such keys need to be kept (for example, to support archived encrypted data), they should be strongly protected.
Archived cryptographic keys should be used only for decryption/verification purposes.
The encryption solution should provide for and facilitate a process to replace keys that are due for replacement or that are known to be, or suspected of being, compromised. In addition, any keys that are known to be, or suspected of being, compromised should be managed in accordance with the entity’s incident response plan per Requirement 12.10.1.
Industry best practices for archiving retired keys are outlined in NIST SP 800-57 Part 1, Revision 5, Section 8.3.1 , and includes maintaining the archive with a trusted third party and storing archived key information separately from operational data.
Split knowledge and dual control of keys are used to eliminate the possibility of a single person having access to the whole key and therefore being able to gain unauthorized access to the data.
Where key components or key shares are used, procedures should ensure that no single custodian ever has access to sufficient key components or shares to reconstruct the cryptographic key. For example, in an m-of-n scheme (for example, Shamir), where only two of any three components are required to reconstruct the cryptographic key, a custodian must not have current or prior knowledge of more than one component. If a custodian was previously assigned component A, which was then reassigned, the custodian should not then be assigned component B or C, as this would give the custodian knowledge of two components and the ability to recreate the key.#### Definitions Split knowledge is a method in which two or more people separately have key components, where each person knows only their own key component, and the individual key components convey no knowledge of other components or of the original cryptographic key.
Dual control requires two or more people to authenticate the use of a cryptographic key or perform a key-management function. No single person can access or use the authentication factor (for example, the password, PIN, or key) of another.
Key-management operations that might be performed manually include, but are not limited to, key generation, transmission, loading, storage, and destruction.
Industry standards for managing key components include:
• NIST SP 800-57 Part 2, Revision 1 -- Recommendation for Key Management: Part 2 – Best Practices for Key Management Organizations [4.6 Keying Material Distribution]
• ISO 11568-2 Banking — Key management (retail) — Part 2 : Symmetric ciphers, their key management and life cycle [4.7.2.3 Key components and 4.9.3 Key components]
• European Payments Council EPC342-08 Guidelines on Cryptographic Algorithms Usage and Key Management [especially 4.1.4 Key installation].
If an attacker is able to substitute an entity’s key with a key the attacker knows, the attacker will be able to decrypt all data encrypted with that key.
The encryption solution should not allow for or accept substitution of keys from unauthorized sources or unexpected processes.
Controls should include ensuring that individuals with access to key components or shares do not have access to other components or shares that form the necessary threshold to derive the key.
This process will help ensure individuals that act as key custodians commit to the key-custodian role and understand and accept the responsibilities. An annual reaffirmation can help remind key custodians of their responsibilities.
Industry guidance for key custodians and their roles and responsibilities includes:
• NIST SP 800-130 A Framework for Designing Cryptographic Key Management Systems [5. Roles and Responsibilities (especially) for Key Custodians]
• ISO 11568-1 Banking -- Key management (retail) -- Part 1 : Principles [5 Principles of key management (especially b)]
Providing guidance to customers on how to securely transmit, store, and update cryptographic keys can help prevent keys from being mismanaged or disclosed to unauthorized entities.
Numerous industry standards for key management are cited above in the Guidance for Requirements 3.7.1- 3.7.8.