Rendering stored PAN unreadable is a defense in depth control designed to protect the data if an unauthorized individual gains access to stored data by taking advantage of a vulnerability or misconfiguration of an entity’s primary access control.
It is a relatively trivial effort for a malicious individual to reconstruct original PAN data if they have access to both the truncated and hashed versions of a PAN. Controls that prevent the correlation of this data will help ensure that the original PAN remains unreadable. Implementing keyed cryptographic hashes with associated key management processes and procedures in accordance with Requirement 3.5.1.1 is a valid additional control to prevent correlation.
For information about truncation formats and truncation in general, see PCI SSC’s FAQs on the topic.
Sources for information about index tokens include:
• PCI SSC’s Tokenization Product Security Guidelines ( https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/T okenization_Product_Security_Guidelines.pdf )
• ANSI X9.119-2-2017: Retail Financial Services - Requirements For Protection Of Sensitive Payment Card Data - Part 2: Implementing Post-Authorization Tokenization Systems
Rendering stored PAN unreadable is a defense in depth control designed to protect the data if an unauthorized individual gains access to stored data by taking advantage of a vulnerability or misconfiguration of an entity’s primary access control.
A hashing function that incorporates a randomly generated secret key provides brute force attack resistance and secret authentication integrity.
Refer to Appendix G for the definition of “keyed cryptographic hash” and for information about appropriate keyed cryptographic hashing algorithms and additional resources.
Systems which only have access to one hash value at a time and which store no other account data on the same system as the hash, are not required to meet key-management processes and procedures (Requirements 3.6 and 3.7). Examples of such systems include transaction-originating devices that generate a hash of the PAN for use in a backend system, such as pay-at-gate transit turnstiles. However, in such an implementation, the backend system will have access to more than one hash value at a time, and therefore is required to meet key-management processes and procedures at Requirements 3.6 and 3.7.
Disk-level and partition-level encryption typically encrypts the entire disk or partition using the same key, with all data automatically decrypted when the system runs or when an authorized user requests it. For this reason, disk-level encryption is not appropriate to protect stored PAN on computers, laptops, servers, storage arrays, or any other system that provides transparent decryption upon user authentication.
Where available, following vendors’ hardening and industry best practice guidelines can assist in securing PAN on these devices.
Disk-level encryption typically encrypts the entire disk or partition using the same key, with all data automatically decrypted when the system runs or when an authorized user requests it. Many disk-encryption solutions intercept operating system read/write operations and perform the appropriate cryptographic transformations without any special action by the user other than supplying a password or passphrase at system start-up or at the beginning of a session. This provides no protection from a malicious individual that has already managed to gain access to a valid user account.
Full disk encryption helps to protect data in the event of physical loss of a disk and therefore its use is best limited only to removable electronic media storage devices.